In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Biographical Encyclopedia of British IdealismKarim DharamsiWilliam Sweet, editor. Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism. New York-London: Continuum, 2010. Pp. xx + 724. Cloth, $295.00.The term ‘British Idealism’ underdetermines the interests and geographies of philosophers classed under its heading. It may imply a common goal or, indeed, location. This is misleading. The Biographical Encyclopedia of British Idealism goes a long way in demonstrating (...) the challenge of grouping together philosophers with divergent interests and historical pedigrees, sharing some affiliation with Idealist thinking in Britain from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many transcend so-called Analytic and Continental categories, and if not transcend, certainly sidestep them. William Sweet’s volume is at once an archaeological guide to British Idealism and a guide to its relevance today. The volume excavates deeply hidden contributions to philosophy and may destabilize our customary assumptions about the geographical limits of Western philosophy; the contributors to the volume ask readers to extend their community of interest to scholars from Southern Africa, India, and East Asia. Calling philosophers working in India and East Asia “British” is also an important reminder; it has its obvious links to British imperium while at the same time speaking to the influence of Idealist thinking outside the frame of colonial England to thinkers working outside the canonical disputes of Western philosophy.This massive volume, uncompromisingly detailed and comprehensive, does have the elements of a survey, but this is not its intent, nor does one get this impression on reading its entries. This Encyclopedia aims to historically and philosophically contextualize Idealist thought. The first six chapters do just this. They are “Idealism in Britain” (William Sweet); “Idealism in Australia and New Zealand” (Mark Weblin); “The Impact of Idealism in North America” (Leslie Armour); “British Idealism in Southern Africa” (William Sweet); “British Idealism in India” (William Sweet); and “British Idealism in East Asia” (William Sweet). [End Page 146] The remainder of the volume includes entries on well-known Idealist philosophers, lesser known thinkers, and important critics of Idealist philosophy, including the familiar and highly influential Russell and Moore. I will say a little bit about the excellent chapter on British Idealism in India.While readers may have familiarity with Idealism in North America and Britain, it may come as a surprise to learn that Indian philosophers, influenced by a great deal of British philosophy, were particularly keen on Idealism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Sweet provides readers with a short history of Indian higher education and the place, for instance, of Kant and Hegel in the philosophy curriculum throughout India in the late nineteenth century; it was not long after that British Idealists were being taught to students in Bombay (Mumbai), Madras, and Calcutta (still important centres of higher education in India) along with Allahabad, Mysore, Pondicherry, and Amalner. Idealists in India, much like their counterparts in Britain, labored beyond academic philosophy, extending their discussions to questions of nationalism in India and contributing to ideas in social and political thought.The attraction of British Idealism (indeed, any “Western” Idealist philosophy) to Indian intellectuals may seem mysterious to some readers. Sweet maintains that Indian philosophy was and is by its own historical sense idealist and so the British variant was not so much as “imported” as finding a natural home. Sweet thinks that the revival of interest in the tradition of Advaita Vedanta can be reasonably traced to the influence of British Idealism’s place in Indian philosophy. There is little dispute that Kant, Hegel, and the British thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced how Indian philosophers understood the discipline’s Western identity and aims. Indian philosophers had begun to enter discussions belonging to another history. Hiralal Halder’s Hegelianism and Human Personality, published in 1910, and Ras-Vihari Das’s doctoral dissertation of 1930, The Self and the Ideal, could easily be taken as titles of works in Western European or North American libraries. Philosophy no doubt includes philosophers who come from many histories, and the discipline may be resistant to simple geographical reduction.Sweet cautions readers that Indian philosophers contributed to the development of Indian philosophical thought; they were not merely expositors... (shrink)

The British Idealist movement flourished between the 1860s and 1920s and exerted a very significant influence in the USA, India and Canada, most notably on John Dewey and Josiah Royce. The movement also laid the groundwork for the thought of Oakeshott and Collingwood. Its leading figures – particularly Green and Caird – have left a number of complete or near complete manuscripts in various British university archives, many of which remain unpublished. This important collection widens access to this (...) unpublished material by transcribing, editing and then publishing the most significant pieces. The project focuses on the moral, political, and religious writings – the areas of most interest to scholars. This annotated, critical edition opens them up to the academic community. (shrink)

Idealism became the dominant philosphical school of thought in late nineteenth-century Britain. In this original and stimulating study, Sandra den Otter examines its roots in Greek and German thinking and locates it among the prevalent methodologies and theories of the period: empiricism and positivism, naturalism, evolution, and utilitarianism. In particular, she sets it in the context of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate about a science of society and the contemporary preoccupation with `community'.

In this original and stimulating study of Idealism, the dominant philosophical school of thought in late nineteenth-century Britain, Sandra den Otter interweaves philosophical and sociological concerns to make an important contribution to intellectual history.

British idealism flourished in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. It was a movement with a lasting influence on the social and political thought of its time in particular. British idealists helped popularize the work of Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel in the Anglophone world, but they also sought to use insights from the philosophies of Kant and Hegel to help create a new idealism to address the many pressing issues of the (...) Victorian period in Britain and its aftermath. These contributions related to theories of freedom, the common good, political obligation, the state, and punishment. The British idealists also made important contributions in areas other than Hegelian scholarship and ethics, including logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. The movement declined by the start of World War I. This entry will highlight the most important work by British idealists themselves and by their best interpreters. Thus this entry will be grouped by individuals rather than by theme. (shrink)

This chapter identifies some themes in British idealism, especially those which resonate in contemporary debates, through an examination of T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley and J.M.E. McTaggart. It focuses primarily on metaphysics and epistemology, supplemented by discussion of the ethics of Green and Bradley. In characterizing British idealism in more detail, it is important to start with T.H. Green, whose importance lay both in his philosophical thought, and also in his active engagement with Oxford local politics, educational (...) standards and school reform, and issues of social justice, the common good and the recognition theory of rights. Green's major philosophical monograph, published posthumously in 1883, was Prolegomena to Ethics. This can be seen as a broadly Kantian account of the presuppositions of knowledge. The two main claims that concern us here are, first, that the real consists in relations and, secondly, that the related whole constitutes an “eternal consciousness”. (shrink)

[INTRODUCTION] Like the terms 'dialectic', 'Aufhebung' (or 'sublation'), and 'Geist', the term 'concrete universal' has a distinctively Hegelian ring to it. But unlike these others, it is particularly associated with the British strand in Hegel's reception history, as having been brought to prominence by some of the central British Idealists. It is therefore perhaps inevitable that, as their star has waned, so too has any use of the term, while an appreciation of the problematic that lay behind it (...) has seemingly vanished: if the British Idealists get any sort of mention in a contemporary metaphysics book (which is rarely), it will be Bradley's view of relations or truth that is discussed, not their theory of universals, so that the term has a rather antique air, buried in the dusty volumes of Mind from the turn of the nineteenth century. This is not surprising: the episode known as British Idealism can appear to be a period that is lost to us, in its language, points of historical reference (Lotze, Sigwart, Jevons), and central preoccupations (the Absolute). Even while interest in Hegel continues to grow, interest in his Logic has grown more slowly than in the rest of his work, with Book III of the Logic remaining as the daunting peak of that challenging text - while it is here that the British Idealists focussed their attention and claimed to have uncovered that 'exotic' but 'vanished specimen', the concrete universal. Finally, as the trend of reading Hegel pushes ever further in a non-metaphysical direction, it might be thought that the future of the concrete universal is hardly likely to be brighter than its recent past - for it may seem hard to imagine how a conception championed by the British Idealists, who were apparently shameless in their metaphysical commitments, can find favour in these more austere and responsible times. In this paper, however, I want to make a case for holding that there is something enlightening to be found in how some of the British Idealists approached the 'concrete universal', both interpretatively and philosophically. At the interpretative level, I will argue that while not everything these Idealists are taken to mean by the term is properly to be found in Hegel, their work nonetheless relates to a crucial and genuine strand in Hegel's position, so that their discussion of this issue is an important moment in the reception history of his thought. At a philosophical level, I think that the question that concerned Hegel and these British Idealists retains much of its interest, as does their shared approach to it: namely, how far does our thought involve a mere abstraction from reality, and what are the metaphysical and epistemological implications if it turns out it does not? As such, I will suggest, taking seriously what these British Idealists have to say about the concrete universal can help us both in our understanding of Hegel, and in our appreciation of the contribution Hegel's position can make to our thinking on the issues that surround this topic. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, a rare strain of British idealism emerged which took Leibniz's Monadology as its starting point. This paper discusses a variant of that strain, offered by Hilda Oakeley. I set Oakeley's monadology in its philosophical context and discuss a key point of conflict between Oakeley and her fellow monadologists: the unreality of time. Oakeley argues that time is fundamentally real, a thesis arguably denied by Leibniz and subsequent monadologists, and by all other British (...) idealists. This paper discusses Oakeley's argument for the reality of time, and Oakeley's attack on the most famous account of the unreality of time offered in her day: that of J. M. E. McTaggart. I show that Oakeley's critique of McTaggart can be extended to challenge all monadologists, including that of the great monad, Leibniz himself. (shrink)

The degree to which British Idealists, both Absolutists and Personalists, were influenced by evolutionary debates has been underestimated, and far from being outright opponents they developed their own particular brand in order to demonstrate the relevance of their philosophies to addressing the important issues of the day. They were opposed to naturalism, but agreed with the likes of Darwin and Spencer that nature and spirit exhibit a continuity. Where they disagreed was in the naturalistic emphasis of giving priority to (...) nature in explanation, that is, explaining the higher in terms of the lower. They also agreed with the likes of Wallace and Huxley, in giving a special place to ethics in the evolutionary process. They disagreed because of the wedge they perceived them to be driving between nature and spirit. The British Idealists begin with the principle of unity and contend that nature and spirit are continuous, and while nature is not intelligent, it is intelligible only to the human mind. Nature and Spirit are mutually dependent and to assert the reality of one over the other is to make abstractions of both. In fully acknowledging spirit in the evolutionary process they were able to reconcile their religious consciousness and the idea of freedom with the theory of evolution. (shrink)

In particular, as we shall see, Collingwood is often dismissed as having held an indefensible, outmoded ‘ideal’ theory, according to which the work of art is primarily ‘mental’, while his potential role in current debates is simply ignored. I will argue that this view is largely mistaken.

It is generally acknowledged that the British Idealism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a significant influence in the philosophy, politics, and culture of that country. In this study, I argue that it also had a considerable impact throughout much of the English-speaking world, and beyond -- in Canada, Australia, the United States, South Africa, India, and even East Asia. This idealism engaged 'local' philosophical traditions and culture, contributed to them, and sometimes led to (...) 'new' philosophies or traditions, and so may be described as a 'migrating tradition.' While the character and extent of this influence varied according to where and how it migrated, British Idealism can, nevertheless and in amodestway, be said to have had an 'empire'. This study, then, addresses both a historical issue and the broader philosophical question of why British Idealism was successful in this diaspora, and it identifies a number of features of this Idealism which may explain this. (shrink)

Perhaps one of the most underappreciated philosophical movements is British Idealism. This movement arose during the latter half of the nineteenth century and began to wane after the outbreak of the First World War. British Idealism has produced a number of important figures, such as Bernard Bosanquet, R. G. Collingwood, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green, as well as other important, but less well known, figures, such as J. S. Mackenzie, John Henry Muirhead and James (...) Seth. It has also given us a number of lasting philosophical ideas. (shrink)

Despite the fact that by the end of the nineteenth century philosophically Natural Rights had been severely undermined, and that the British Idealists found anathema most of the principles upon which they relied, such theories still had a currency among some political polemicists. The Idealists retained the vocabulary and transformed the meaning to refer to those rights which it is imperative that the state or society recognise as indispensable to social existence. The criterion of such necessity was their contribution (...) to the common good. Such thinks as Green, Bosanquet, Ritchie, Jones and Watson offer a developmental view of Natural Rights, acknowledging that societies evolve giving rise to more refined versions of what constitutes the common good. While the idea of Human Rights depends upon the existence of a moral community, the common good is not necessarily judged only in relation to that community. There is nothing sacred about state borders or sovereignty, and the extension of the moral community beyond such arbitrary limits is both possible and desirable. This way of conceiving Natural Rights has become one of the dominant ways, in a variety of forms, of characterising the post 1945 Human Rights Culture. r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Despite the fact that by the end of the nineteenth century philosophically Natural Rights had been severely undermined, and that the British Idealists found anathema most of the principles upon which they relied, such theories still had a currency among some political polemicists. The Idealists retained the vocabulary and transformed the meaning to refer to those rights which it is imperative that the state or society recognise as indispensable to social existence. The criterion of such necessity was their contribution (...) to the common good. Such thinks as Green, Bosanquet, Ritchie, Jones and Watson offer a developmental view of Natural Rights, acknowledging that societies evolve giving rise to more refined versions of what constitutes the common good. While the idea of Human Rights depends upon the existence of a moral community, the common good is not necessarily judged only in relation to that community. There is nothing sacred about state borders or sovereignty, and the extension of the moral community beyond such arbitrary limits is both possible and desirable. This way of conceiving Natural Rights has become one of the dominant ways, in a variety of forms, of characterising the post 1945 Human Rights Culture. (shrink)

In truth-functional analysis we need not worry about the purported ambiguity of the English ‘or,’ for we can assign different symbols and define each by means of a truth table. However, at least in classes in elementary logic, we often try to indicate that there is some rationale to the assignation of truth values by marshaling English disjunctive sentences which will clearly render an inclusive or an exclusive reading, without the explicit addition of one of the qualifying phrases, “or both” (...) or “but not both.” At this point one discovers people writing on logic saying quite different things about the English ‘or.’ In his Methods of Logic Quine takes the inclusive sense to be the more naturally intended and claims that “indisputable instances of the exclusive use” are rare. Yet in The Principles of Logic Bradley says that no one ever really intends to use ‘or’ in any other than an exclusive sense; and Bosanquet followed him in this. In this paper I am interested in attempting to discover why the British Idealists held that ‘or’ is always exclusive, especially in the face of various examples which, prima facie, establish both uses in English. Why would Bradley feel compelled to deny “any possible instance in which alternatives are not exclusive”? As it turns out, the position held by Bradley and Bosanquet is stronger and more interesting than one initially expects. (shrink)

W. J. Mander and Stamatoula Panagakou’s book is one of the latest expressions of the resurgence of British Idealism after its demotion in British philosophy as a result of the ascendancy of analyti...

According to the editors of this book, “The history of philosophy as taught today is a highly selective activity. In its determination to tell a particular story, it passes over in silence large swathes of otherwise interesting philosophical work”. This claim would have been worthy of serious consideration had it been made a few decades ago—that is to say, at a time when analytic philosophy was a clearly recognizable philosophical movement. The “particular story” according to which the works of the (...) British idealists were allegedly sacrificed would then have been easily identified as the story of how the young Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore showed the absurdity involved in holding that... (shrink)

A new moral philosophy emerged on the British philosophical scene in the late 1870s, one referred to as the idealist ethic of social self-realization, which rapidly became the dominant mode of moral thought for over twenty years. This chapter discusses the views of the pioneers of idealist ethics, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green.

This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. (...) There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach of implementing of social justice. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is contended that British Idealists, New Liberals and Liberal Imperialists were all in favour of imperialism, especially when it took the form of white settler communities. The concession of relative autonomy was an acknowledgement of the potential of white settler communities to go the way of America by severing their relationship with the Empire completely. Where significant differences emerge in their thinking is in relation to non-white territories in the Empire where native peoples comprised the majority, and the (...) British Government and its agents administered in trust ‘lower’ peoples on the scale of civilisation with the ostensible goal of guiding them towards self-determination in the Empire. The differences in degree of commitment to these ideals were largely expressed in terms of the pejorative categories of ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ imperialism, which were flexible and manipulated for political gain, rather than analytic precision. Liberal Imperialists and New Liberals were opposed to each other in terms of the degree to which they supported imperialism, whereas British Idealists aligned themselves on both sides of the divide. (shrink)

The British Idealists were a force to be reckoned with in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until they appeared as the philosophical casualty of the Great War. This volume, part of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, reproduces selections dealing with social and political philosophy from ten different authors of that tradition. Leading political theorist Bernard Bosanquet has three separate selections totaling fifty-three pages. T. H. Green has only one passage included here since there exists (...) a Cambridge published selection of his work put out in 1986. (shrink)

Often regarded as an aberrant phase in the history of late 19th and early 20th-century philosophy, British Idealism provoked a wide range of attacks and replies from all the major figures of the time, such as Sidgwick, Dewey, Broad and Russell. This work reflects the shifting intellectual boundaries of British Thought between 1860 and 1920.

ABSTRACTBritish Idealism was the philosophical school which dominated during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Using the ideas of Bernard Bosanquet, John Caird and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison as an illustration, this paper looks at some of the ways in which the British Idealists sought to develop new and more subtle conceptions of the transcendent, able to resist the corrosive effects of late nineteenth-century critical and naturalistic thinking. The paper concludes by looking at three fields – philosophy, theology (...) and literature – in which it is possible to discern the ongoing influence into the first half of the twentieth century of their efforts. (shrink)

The growing interest in the philosophy of the British Idealists required a comprehensive and accessible volume containing an anthology of their work. Boucher’s book, with its special emphasis on the moral, social and political philosophy of British Idealism, fills a gap in the existing literature and provides readers with the insights of such philosophers as Edward Caird, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, John Watson, Bernard Bosanquet, Henry Jones, D. G. Ritchie, J.H. Muirhead, Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, and (...) J.S. Mackenzie. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article surveys and contextualizes the British idealists’ philosophical writings on language, aesthetics and emotions, starting with T. H. Green and concluding with Michael Oakeshott. It highlights ways in which their philosophical insights have been wrongly overlooked by later writers. It explores R. L. Nettleship’s posthumous publications in this field and notes that they exerted significant influences on British idealists and closely related figures, such as Bernard Bosanquet and R. G. Collingwood. The writing of other figures are also (...) explored, not least F. H. Bradley and J. A. Smith. The article concludes by introducing in turn the remaining articles that are found in this special issue. (shrink)

Samuel Alexander was a central figure of the new wave of realism that swept across the English-speaking world in the early twentieth century. His Space, Time, and Deity (1920a, 1920b) was taken to be the official statement of realism as a metaphysical system. But many historians of philosophy are quick to point out the idealist streak in Alexander’s thought. After all, as a student he was trained at Oxford in the late 1870s and early 1880s as British Idealism (...) was beginning to flourish. This naturally had some effect on his philosophical outlook and it is said that his early work is overtly idealist. In this paper I examine his neglected and understudied reactions to British Idealism in the 1880s. I argue that Alexander was not an idealist during this period and should not be considered as part of the British Idealist tradition, philosophically speaking. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Strange Death of British IdealismEdward SkidelskyIIn 1958, the Oxford philosopher G. J. Warnock opened his survey of twentieth-century English philosophy with some disparaging comments on British Idealism. It was, he writes, "an exotic in the English scene, the product of a quite recent revolution in ways of thought due primarily to German influences." Analytic philosophy, by contrast, represents a return to the venerable lineage of (...) British empiricism, as Bertrand Russell "symbolically joins hands" with his godfather John Stuart Mill. "Hume and Berkley would have been sadly puzzled by the pages of Bradley, to say nothing of Hegel's. But either might have conversed quite naturally with Moore, and with Russell too, at least in his less technical moments."1All this is rhetoric rather than history. Russell can be called the inheritor of Mill only with respect to his political and social attitudes; his main philosophical endeavour—the establishment of mathematics on a priori foundations—ran diametrically opposed to Mill. And Hume and Berkley would have been just as sadly puzzled by Moore's analysis of language—an activity they both regarded as the defining vice of scholasticism—as by anything in Bradley.Warnock's error has proved remarkably persistent. Only recently, thanks largely to the work of Peter Hylton, has the anti-empiricist, Platonist character of Russell's early thought been properly appreciated.2 I do not intend, in what follows, to retrace these philosophical arguments. My question is historical. It concerns the role of national feeling, first in the demise of Idealism after the First World War, and later in the interpretation of that demise after the Second. With regard to first question, I argue that the rejection of Idealism in Britain was in no sense [End Page 41] a reassertion of national tradition. The opposite is closer to the truth; the change in philosophical fashion was primarily a consequence of a widespread revulsion against nationalism following World War I. That this was later misinterpreted owes largely—and this is my second claim—to the very different climate prevailing in Britain after World War II. If in the twenties the British reserved their scorn for "Prussian militarism," in the fifties everything associated with Germany, its philosophy included, was viewed as irredeemably tainted. Analytic philosophy tried to present itself as a home-grown product, with deep roots in the English empiricist tradition. This partly accounts for the change in style from the highly technical scientism of Russell and the logical positivists to the concern with "ordinary language" characteristic of post-war Oxford philosophy. The fact that most of analytic philosophy's continental exponents were forced by Hitler into British or American exile assisted in the process of its naturalisation. Within a decade, it was possible to regard "analytic" and "Anglo-Saxon" philosophy as synonyms.Warnock's mistake now becomes easier to understand. He has interpreted the early twentieth century in the light of the post-war period, coming to the conclusion that Moore and Russell's rejection of Idealism was a reassertion of English national tradition. He has condensed fifty years of history into a single moment. I intend in what follows to pull apart the stages that Warnock has concertinaed together, demonstrating that national feeling played a far more complex and contradictory role in the history of British philosophy.IIOn one point Warnock is correct: Idealism did not perish of refutation. "Metaphysical systems do not yield...," he writes, "to frontal attack. Their odd property of being demonstrable only, so to speak, from within confers on them also a high resistance to attack from outside.... Such systems are much more vulnerable to ennui than to disproof" (Warnock, pp. 10–11). The claim of Russell and Moore to have "refuted" Bradley is regarded with scepticism by most recent commentators. Idealism, they point out, rested on something more substantial than a mere failure of logic or common-sense, and was therefore not vulnerable to the kind of simple knock-down arguments advanced by Russell and Moore. The causes of its decline must be sought elsewhere, in the broader cultural and political tendencies of the age.Had Russell and Moore's arguments been truly knock-down... (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between two influential intellectual schools in late 19th century Britain, namely social evolutionary theories and British Idealism, by focusing on the work of D.G. Ritchie who drew inspiration from both sources. In particular, it argues that Ritchie's work can best be understood as an attempt to overcome certain metaphysical problems in the work of his teacher, T.H. Green, by integrating an Idealist account of social development with a Darwinian one, and analyses the effects (...) this synthesis has for his social and political thought. Ritchie's approach is also set in the context of developments in Victorian evolutionary theory and is contrasted with that of other influential Idealists, notably Bernard Bosanquet. More widely, it is claimed that examining Ritchie's synthesis sheds light on the degree to which the labels “idealist” and “positivist” can be reliably used in the later Victorian period, in the areas of both scientific and social investigation. (shrink)

This book tells the story of idealism in modern philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann define idealism as the reduction of all reality to something mental in nature. Rather than distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological versions of idealism, they distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological motivations for idealism. They argue that while metaphysical arguments for idealism have only rarely been accepted, for example by Bishop Berkeley in (...) the early eighteenth century and the British idealists Bradley and McTaggart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epistemological arguments for idealism have been widely accepted, even in the so-called analytic philosophy of the twentieth century. Guyer and Horstmann discuss many philosophers who have played a role in the development of idealism, from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, through Kant; the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; the British and American idealists such as Green and Royce in addition to Bradley and McTaggart; G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, Neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer; and twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Collingwood, Carnap, Sellars, and McDowell. (shrink)

British idealism is usually regarded as having been, in the main, indifferent to the problems of the philosophy of history. The interest in the philosophy of history found in German, and later in Italian, idealism was allegedly not shared by the early generations of the British idealists. At best they are regarded as unwitting precursors of things to come, some of their reflections paving the way for subsequent advances in historical thinking. The British idealists, however, (...) were not as economical with their historical pronouncements as commonly believed. A more careful examination of their general writings and lesser known contributions reveals a more complex picture. One of stronger historical consciousness, knowledge of the philosophical developments in history, interest in its problems, and active involvement with historical scholarship. Further study will certainly illuminate the details of the entire character of British idealism with regard to its historical concerns. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.

SummaryThe purpose of this article is to critically undermine two commonly held and closely related contentions regarding the British idealist tradition. The first is that the British idealist tradition went into rapid and terminal decline shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. The second is that J. A. Smith was largely responsible for it. These aims are achieved through a diachronic analysis of Smith's conception of human imperfection as well as an assessment of Smith's intellectual legacy. (...) As this article will show, contrary to the received view, Smith was a philosophical innovator who instigated an intellectual evolution within the British idealist. In particular, this article shows that Smith substituted aspects of his early Greenian philosophy with elements of Italian idealism. As a result, Smith was instrumental in moving British idealism away from its traditional underpinnings and towards more a Croce–Gentilian foundation. It is this neglected philosophical innovation which has given scholars the false impression of the tradition's collapse. By establishing Smith's intellectual innovation this article intends to show that Smith made a much more significant intellectual contribution to the philosophical tradition to which he belongs than has so far been recognised. (shrink)

The British idealists of the late 19th and early 20th century are best known for their contributions to metaphysics, logic, and political philosophy. Yet they also made important contributions to social and public policy, social and moral philosophy and moral education, as shown by this volume. Their views are not only important in their own right, but also bear on contemporary discussion in public policy and applied ethics. Among the authors discussed are Green, Caird, Ritchie, Bradley, Bosanquet, Jones, McTaggart, (...) Pringle-Pattison, Webb, Ward, Mackenzie, Hetherington, Muirhead, Collingwood and Oakeshott. The writings of idealist philosophers from Canada, South Africa, and India are also examined. Contributors include Avital Simhony, Darin Nesbitt, Carol A. Keene, Stamatoula Panagakou, David Boucher, Leslie Armour, Jan Olof Bengtsson, Thom Brooks, James Connelly, Philip MacEwen, Efraim Podoksik, Elizabeth Trott and William Sweet. (shrink)

In recent years "British" Idealism has been subject to sweeping re-evaluation and rehabilitation. The essays collected here by Will Sweet compare Bernard Bosanquet's ideas and arguments with those of Idealists and non-Idealists alike, and establish that Bosanquet was far more clear-headed and insightful than denunciations of the "Idealist school" by Moore, Russell, C. D. Broad, Harold Prichard, and A. J. Ayer suggest. Sweet observes in his introduction that Bosanquet has long remained in the shadows of T. H. Green (...) and F. H. Bradley, that Bosanquet was a prolific writer who shaped philosophical debates across the English-speaking world for decades, and that estimations of his social theory and political philosophy, and to a lesser extent his metaphysics, have diverted attention from his contributions to logic and aesthetics.Essays by Sandra M. den Otter, Peter Nicholson, and Kevin Sullivan deal directly with Bosanquet's social philosophy. Bosanquet was engaged from the 1880s in work with the Charity Organisation Society, an association that set the tone of late Victorian and Edwardian debates over British poverty. He and his wife served on the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws , against whose majority statement—cautioning against such direct assistance to the poor as. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAlthough the British Idealists did not provide a systematic account of language as a distinct philosophical phenomenon, language is nonetheless a fundamental element of Idealist social and political philosophy. This is seen mostly in the Idealist treatment of the concept of general will, which resulted in a Hegelian theory of community, constituted by shared understandings and a shared account of the common good and common interest. This article contains analysis of the relations between language and socio-political institutions in (...) class='Hi'>British Idealist writings. The narrative focuses on Thomas Hill Green and Bernard Bosanquet – two major political thinkers representing the said philosophical tradition. The argument proceeds as follows: firstly, possible linguistic interpretations of the Idealist philosophical tradition are introduced. Then the author turns to Green’s conception of general will as the foundation of socio-political order and political sovereignty. In the third section, he... (shrink)

Along with utilitarianism, British idealism was the most important philosophical and practical movement in Britain and its Empire during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Even though the British idealists have regained some of their standing in the history of philosophy, their own historical theories still fail to receive the deserved scholarly attention. This article helps to fill that major gap in the literature. Understanding historiography as concerning the appropriate modes of enquiring into the recorded past, this article (...) analyses the key historiographical commitments that underpin the writings of the early T.H. Green (section two), Edward Caird (section three), and F.H. Bradley (sections four and five). Section six explores the influence of Bradley's historiography. These approaches are linked by the belief that all thought can be properly understood only by critical historians who possess the appropriate tools with which to distinguish permanently valid truths from the transient imperfections with which those truths are mixed. A crucial division between them is the invocation of a neo-Hegelian Geist by the early Green and Caird, and Bradley's reliance on a progressive human nature. Moreover, the article establishes that R.G. Collingwood's highly influential theories of “absolute presuppositions” and “re-enactment” were taken largely from Bradley's historiography. (shrink)